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NOTES
Oil and Gas: Ejusdem Generis: Oklahoma's Approach
to the Interpretation of "Other Minerals" After
Commissioners of Land Office v. Butler
Introduction
One of the most controversial issues plaguing the courts in energy produc-
ing states is the meaning of the word "minerals." Whether standing alone
or contained in a grant of "oil, gas and other minerals," the term creates
a great deal of interpretational difficulties. It is generally accepted that without
qualifying language the meaning of "minerals" is uncertain in a mineral grant
or reservation.1 Because of this uncertainty courts must employ various doc-
trines and tests to assist in determining the meaning of the term. Extrinsic
evidence is also usually examined to determine whether a substance will be
included in the mineral estate.' The application of the varying doctrines and
tests available has led to such a level of inconsistency and uncertainty that
courts in the same jurisdictions, adjudicating similar grants, arrive at deci-
sions which are seemingly irreconcilable.
Oklahoma is not immune to the problems associated with interpreting a
mineral conveyance. Oklahoma's early resolutions of such conveyances depend-
ed on a practical construction approach of ascertaining the plain intent of
the grantor by the use of extrinsic evidence. 3 Since then, Oklahoma has
employed a variety of constructional aids to determine the meaning of am-
biguous terms within mineral grants and reservations.' The most recent
Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions considering the meaning of "other
minerals" have indicated the court's willingness to rely exclusively on the doc-
trine of ejusdem generis as the preferred method of construction.
Ejusdem generis literally means "[o]f the same kind, class or nature." The
doctrine of ejusdem generis prescribes that where general words follow words
of a particular and specific meaning, the general words are held to apply only
to things of the same general kind or class as those specifically enumerated.-
1. R. HEMINGWAY, Tm LAW OF OL AND GAS 10 (2d ed. 1983).
2. Id. at 14.
3. Campbell v. Ratcliff Land Co., 64 Okla. 249, 167 P. 468 (1917).
4. Bell, The Continuing Problem of "Other Minerals:" Oklahoma Needs a Uniform Rule
of Construction, 56 OKLA. B.J. 2919 (Dec. 21, 1985) (Oklahoma has used at least four different
tests: (1) practical construction, (2) practical construction coupled with ejusdem generis, (3) ejusdem
generis, and (4) exceptional characteristics).
5. BLACK's LAW DicTONARY 270 (5th ed. 1983). See also 73 Am. JuR. 2D. STATUTES § 214
(1974).
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For example, gypsum, salt water, copper, silver and gold have been excluded
from conveyances of oil, gas and other minerals. 6
In a recent Oklahoma Supreme Court case, Commissioners of Land Office
v. Butler ("Butler 11"),7 the court relied exclusively on ejusdem generis to
interpret three mineral conveyances.' This decision illustrates major problems
with the doctrine of ejusdem generis as it is now being used by the Oklahoma
courts.
This note's analysis of Butler 11 will focus on the difficulties the case has
created in three primary areas. The first difficulty was caused by the Butler
1I court's application of ejusdem generis, a simple constructional aid, to over-
ride seemingly clear legislative intent. A second difficulty was created when
the court refused to admit relevant extrinsic evidence. Third, the court failed
to explain what properties or chemical compositions of a substance determine
whether the substance is similar enough to the named substances to be of
like kind and character. 9
The difficulties created by the Butler II decision could be eliminated with
the court' s adoption of either of two alternatives. First, if the court recognized
the inherent ambiguity of an "other mineral" conveyance and admitted ex-
trinsic evidence when available, the court could reach a conclusion more con-
sistent with the intent of the contracting parties. Second, the court could avoid
difficulties altogether with the adoption of a test which more nearly approx-
imates the natural separation of the mineral from the surface estate.
An in-depth survey of the development of the "other minerals" terminology
is beyond the scope of this note. A brief summary, however, of some of the
reasons for the phrase and some of the problems attendant with its inter-
pretation is critical to an understanding of Butler 11. Additionally, some
background on the development of ejusdem generis in Oklahoma is necessary
to place Butler 11 in the proper context. Following the Butler 11 analysis, this
note will examine several approaches which, if applied to the facts of Butler
11, would prove more flexible when dealing with substances made valuable
by advancing technology, yet more consistent in the separation of the mineral
from the surface estate.
The Ambiguities of "Oil, Gas, and Other Minerals"
The meaning of the word "mineral" as it is used in a legal instrument,
such as a mineral grant or lease differs from the meaning of "mineral" in
6. Eike v. Amoco Prod. Co., 54 OKLA. B.J. 414 (Feb. 8, 1983) (upheld trial court's opinion
holding salt water to be a part of the surface estate) (substituting Eike v. Amoco Prod. Co.,
51 OKLA. B.J. 2686 (Nov. 12, 1980)). Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1960) (holding
gypsum was not included in a deed of "oil, gas and other minerals"); Allen v. Farmers Union
Coop. Royalty Co., 538 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1975) (holding copper, gold, and silver not included
in a reservation of "all oil, gas, and other minerals").
7. 753 P.2d 1334 (Okla. 1988) (5-4 decision), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 557 (1988) (Butler
II). Butler v. State, 53 OaL. B.J. 130 (Jan. 19, 1982) (5-4 decision) (Butler 1).
8. Id.




its commonplace usage. ' I A substance may be a mineral in the sense that it
is a naturally occurring homogenous substance, neither vegetable nor animal,
obtained from the ground for human use.II This definition, however, has been
recognized as overly broad within the context of a mineral conveyance. The
soil itself would be included in this definition, destroying the distinction bet-
ween the mineral estate and the land itself.II Still, courts have resisted placing
undue restrictions on the term, such as limiting it to only precious metals
or metallic ores.' 3
Generally, the issue of whether a particular substance is a mineral in the
legal sense arises because the mineral estate has been severed from the surface
estate, either by lease or by deed.' 4 The language of a mineral grant or reser-
vation customarily includes "and other minerals" after specific minerals have
been named." For example, many grants and reservations include the phrase
such as "oil, gas and other minerals." The trouble arises from the language
"other minerals" when no language defines the term. The issue becomes
whether a particular substance is a part of the surface estate or the mineral
estate.II
Often the dispute occurs because a surface owner attempts to prevent a
mineral owner from extracting a particular substance. The surface owner may
want to extract the substance directly or convey it through another grant,
or the surface owner might fear damage to the surface estate if the mineral
owner is allowed the right of extraction. Occasionally, a government agency
grants or reserves some part of property entrusted to it; the question arises
with respect to what minerals were either granted or reserved in the instru-
ment. The dispute often ends with a court trying to establish and effectuate
the intent of the parties to the original severance.' 7
10. Reeves, The Meaning of the Word "Minerals," 54 N.D.L. REv. 419, 423 (1978).
11. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 725 (1979).
12. R. HEWINGWAY, supra note 1, at 2.
13. Id.
14. By conveyance the two estates have been separated from each other so that each is ex-
clusive of and independent from the other.
15. Lowe, What Substances Are Minerals, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 2-1, 2-2 (1984).
Professor Lowe cites three reasons drafters used the term "other minerals" in addition to specifically
named substances: (1) legitimate concern that substances with substantial economic value would
not be covered otherwise; (2) the inclusion of "other minerals" might have been a hedge against
the discovery of other valuable substances. 3) a possible attempt at drafting a "Mother Hub-
bard" clause that would catch anything of value discovered in the future. Id. See also Bell,
The Continuing Problem of "Other Minerals'" Oklahoma Needs a Uniform Rule of Construc-
tion, 56 OKLA. B.J. 2919 (Dec. 21, 1985). "This question of whether coal is a mineral is an
example of an issue circling back to its point of origin. Early oil and gas law largely developed
by maintaining that the mineral reservations of 'coal and other minerals' included oil and gas." Id.
16. Horse Creek Land & Mining Co. v. Midkiff, 95 S.E. 26, 27 (W. Va. 1918). The West
Virginia court concluded that the term "mineral" included every inorganic substance which could
be extracted from the earth for profit. See also Stowers v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 72
F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934).
17. Lowe, supra note 15, at 2-6.
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A court facing the issue must first look to the document itself, attempting
to objectively ascertain the intent of the parties from the "four corners" of
the instrument.' Often an examination of the grant or reservation itself proves
inconclusive because at the time the documents were drafted, the substance
at issue may have been unheard of or lacking in commercial appeal.
When the -parties' intent cannot be found in the documents themselves, the
courts will turn to constructional aids and circumstantial tests to resolve uncer-
tainties of language and intent. 19 Oklahoma courts have resorted to construc-
tional aids and circumstantial tests as they have struggled with the interpreta-
tion of conveyances and reservations which lack specificity. 0 Butler 11 is the
latest in a series of cases which illustrate the difficulties Oklahoma has had
in this area. 2' Butler 11 also highlights the weaknesses of ejusdem generis as
a constructional aid and illustrates how the doctrine may be misapplied to
superceed legislative intent.
Ejusdem Generis in Oklahoma
Courts first applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis in Oklahoma to inter-
pret a deed with three separate and confusing conveyance clauses.2 2 The doc-
trine's initial application, in Wolf v. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 23 aided the
court in determining what minerals were included in a mineral conveyance.
The Wolf court applied ejusdem generis to two separate clauses in an oil and
gas lease. 24 The court concluded that where "general words follow the enumera-
tion of particular classes of minerals, the general words will be construed as




19. Lowe, supra note 9, at 118-19. Aids to construction of an ambiguous document include
constructing the language against the grantor and ejusdem generis. Circumstantial tests include
whether the community knowledge of the substance considered it a mineral at the time of the
conveyance, looking to the exceptional characteristics of a substance to give it value as a mineral,
the practical construction rule establishing the intent of the parties by their concomitant and
subsequent actions, and considering the damage of extraction to the surface. Id. at 119. See
also Reeves, supra note 10, at 453.
20. See Bell, supra note 15.
21. See Eike v. Amoco Prod. Co., 51 OKLA. B.J. 2686 (Nov. 12, 1980) (Eike 1) (holding
that salt water was a mineral and included in the mineral estate), opinion withdrawn, 53 OKLA.
B.J. 2602 (Oct. 21, 1982), reversed without opinion, 54 OKLA. B.J. 414 (Feb. 8, 1983) (Eike
11) (upholding trial court's ruling which found that salt water was a part of the surface estate
and not a mineral to be included within a conveyance of "oil, gas, and other minerals"). It
should be noted that both Eike I and Eike 11 used ejusdem generis as support for their conclu-
sions. See also Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1960); Panhandle Coop. Royalty
Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1971); Allen v. Farmers Union Coop. Royalty Co.,
538 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1975); Vest v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 536 P.2d 393 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
22. See West, 536 P.2d at 393, for early applications of ejusdem generis in Oklahoma.
23. 77 Okla. 1, 186 P. 484 (1920).
24. The granting clause contained language "all the oil, gas, and other minerals," and the
royalty clause stated "all oil, or other minerals."
25. The court further held, "the general term 'other minerals' following the word 'oil' must




Since Wolf, Oklahoma courts have often applied ejusdem generis to inter-
pret conveyances of "oil, gas and other minerals." Several key cases subse-
quent to Wolf have firmly entrenched the doctrine of ejusdem generis in
Oklahoma law. Cronkhite v. Falkenstein6 held that gypsum was not includ-
ed in a grant of "oil, gas and other minerals."" A caveat by the Cronkhite
court, however, made it clear that ejusdem generis was not to be used if the
result was contrary to the intent of the parties. 28 Still more recent cases have
held that copper, silver and gold were not included in a grant of "oil, gas
and other minerals," 2 9 nor was metallic ore or any mineral conveyed in a
similar deed.'"
Case law involving the doctrine of ejusdem generis indicates that Oklahoma
has followed an apparently logical progression toward the absolute adoption
of the doctrine. However, the law's development on this issue has been plagued
by difficulties which illustrate the infirmities associated with ejusdem generis.
No doubt the problems with the doctrine are one reason why only a minority
of states have applied it."
One difficulty with the doctrine is that the cases do not agree on whether
a grant of "oil, gas and other minerals" is ambiguous. In the case of Allen
v. Farmers Union Cooperative Royalty Co., 32 the court held a deed of "oil,
gas and other minerals" to be ambiguous, 33 despite an earlier case holding
an identical deed unambiguous.'
4
Another difficulty is that while the courts have ruled that "other minerals"
are those produced as a constituent or component of oil and gas, the courts
have provided no clear method of determining what those constituents or com-
ponents might be. If the test for labelling a substance a "component" or
"constituent" is whether the substance is produced from the same well bore,
helium and carbon dioxide should fall within that classification because they
can be produced from the same bore hole. However, saltwater, which often
comes from the same borehole as well, has been ruled to be a part of the
surface estate. 5 If, on the other hand, the test is whether the substances are
of similar chemical composition, then coal, which like oil and gas is a hydrocar-
bon, should be a component or constituent. Coal, however, has consistently
been excluded from an "oil, gas and other mineral" reservation.
36
26. Cronkhite, 352 P.2d at 396.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 398-99.
29. Panhandle Coop. Royalty Co., 495 P.2d at 108. The court specifically stated that ejusdem
generis would not be used to ascertain the intent of the parties. However, the court recognized
the doctrine as being a useful part of Oklahoma law when interpreting words of doubtful mean-
ing. See id.
30. See Allen, 538 P.2d at 204.
31. R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 1, at 16. Professor Hemingway notes that only five states
seem to follow the rule: Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Indiana, and Wyoming.
32. 538 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1975).
33. Id. at 208.
34. See Panhandle Coop. Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1971).
35. See Eike II, 53 OIIA. B.J. at 2602.
36. See Commissioners of Land Office v. Butler, 753 P.2d at 1334.
1989]
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Additional difficulties exist when attempting to define "minerals" standing
alone in a grant or reservation. When interpreting deeds with the language
"all mineral rights reserved," Oklahoma courts have taken diverse approaches
to the issue. For example, Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence held that water was
not a mineral . The court based its ruling on the fact that the commercial
world and the mining industry do not ordinarily consider water to be a
mineral. 38 In addition, Holland v. Dolese39 excluded limestone from a grant
of "mineral rights." The Holland court concluded that mineral rights were
to be interpreted by their ordinary and natural meaning." A substance had
to be rare and exceptional in character to be classified as a mineral.4'
Oklahoma case law illustrates the inconsistent approaches taken by courts
when faced with grants of "oil, gas and other minerals" or "minerals" or
"all mineral rights." The Butler decisions in particular illustrate the incon-
sistency and difficulty inherent with the doctrine of ejusdem generis general-
ly, and are conclusive evidence that no single approach used thus far in
Oklahoma has proven satisfactory.
The Butler Decisions
The most recent Oklahoma Supreme Court case involving the doctrine of
ejusdem generis is Butler 11,"2 which involved the supreme court's construc-
tion of patents issued by the state of Oklahoma.
Claude Butler owned land which his predecessor in interest had acquired
through three separate patents from the Commissioners of the Land Office
issued by public sale. The interests in land were part of a state administered
trust for the benefit of Oklahoma's common schools."3 One patent reserved
to the state "an undivided fifty percentum of all oil, gas and other mineral
rights." The reservations of the other two patents read "an undivided fifty
percentum of all oil, gas and other minerals and mineral rights."44
37. 389 P.2d 955 (Okla. 1964).
38. Id. at 961.
39. 540 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1975).
40. Id. at 551.
41. Id.
42. Butler 1, 753 P.2d at 1334.
43. As set out in 64 OKLA. STAT. § 1 (1941), the Commissioners of the Land Office of the
State of Oklahoma ("Commissioners") are charged with administering a federally created trust.
This trust originated from lands and monies given to the state at the time of Oklahoma's admis-
sion to the Union. Butler 1, 53 OKL B.J. at 133 n.3. The trust funds investments include farm
mortgages within the state. OKLA. CONsT. art. XI, § 6. In the event the mortgaged property
is foreclosed, title to the land is vested in the state and the land becomes part of the corpus
of the trust. The beneficiaries of the trust are the Oklahoma common schools. Id. at § 2. The
Commissioners have statutory authority to sell the public land contained within the trust. 64
OKLA. STAT. § 94 (1941). The terms of the sales contracts are controlled by 64 OicLA. STAT.
§ 96 (1941), which provides in relevent part that "[tlhe Commissioners ... shall, in all cases,
reserve and retain forever title to fifty (50%) per centum of all the oil, gas, and other mineral
rights in and under lands so sold."




Butler brought an action to quiet title to the rights to coal on the property
he had acquired. Butler claimed that the phrase "oil, gas and other minerals"
had an established meaning in Oklahoma and that it included only oil, gas
and minerals produced as a component or constituent thereof.45 Butler's posi-
tion therefore, was that coal found on his property belonged to him; the state
had not reserved coal in its "oil, gas and mineral rights" reservation.
The trial court considered the pleadings and briefs of the parties and perti-
nent documents. The documents included minutes of the Commissioners'
meeting at which the sale of the lands in question was authorized.16 The Com-
missioners argued that these showed the intent of the Commissioners was to
reserve fifty percent of all mineral rights, not just fifty percent of the oil,
gas and like minerals.
47
The trial court granted Butler summary judgment and quieted title to the
coal rights in him. The court held that the language in the patents was clear
and unambiguous with no distinctions between the three patents. The court
determined the intent of the parties from the reservation and sale documents
alone, finding no need for extrinsic evidence to determine the intent." The
court concluded that the reservation of "other minerals" meant minerals pro-
duced as components or constituents of oil and gas.
4
The Commissioners appealed, contending that the phrase "oil, gas and other
minerals" was ambiguous and extrinsic evidence should therefore be admit-
ted to show the intent of the original conveying parties."0 Additionally, the
Commissioners asserted that differences in wording between the resolution
to sell the property and the notice for sale,' and the patents, supported the
argument for the admission of extrinsic evidence. Finally, the Commissioners
argued that the Oklahoma Constitution forbade them to diminish the corpus
of the common school trust. The Commissioners argued that it was therefore
beyond their authority to convey the coal rights without specific remuneration.
2
The Initial Decision-Butler I
The Oklahoma Supreme Court first heard the Butler controversy in January
of 1982 ("Butler I"), holding that the Commissioners were statutorily en-
powered to convey no more than fifty percent of all minerals in state-owned
land.5
3
The court concluded that all of the statutory provisions dealing with the
same general subject should be read together and their provisions harmoniz-
45. Id.
46. Butler I, 53 Okla. B.J. at 131.
47. Id. at 132. The language "all mineral rights" contained in the resolution was subsequent-
ly changed, possibly from scrivener's error, to read "oil, gas, and other mineral rights" when
notice of the sales was published. The patents and certificates of sale contained language similar
to the notice of sale. Id.
48. Butler I, 53 OrLA. B.J. at 131.
49. Id.
50. Butler I, 753 P.2d at 1336.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1339.
53. Butler I, 53 OKLA. B.J. at 130. (Majority opinion written by Justice Opala).
1989]
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ed.5 In an analysis of the cluster of statutes under title 64, of the Oklahoma
Statutes dealing with the sale of property owned by the public and admin-
sistered by the Commissioners, the court held that the plain and ordinary
language of the statutes required the Commissioners to reserve fifty percent
of all the minerals, including coal. 5 Consequently, with respect to the three
patents involved in Butler, the Commissioners were powerless to convey more
than fifty percent of the coal rights to the owner's predecessors, because they
could not convey more than was statutorily authorized.
5 6
The court noted that the statute"' required the Commissioners to adopt a
resolution authorizing the sale of any land under the statute. The court allowed
the admission of extrinsic evidence, primarily the minutes of the meeting dur-
ing which the resolution to sell had been passed, to conclude that the Com-
missioners' original intent was to retain fifty percent of all minerals. The lower
court had previously disallowed this evidence. 8 The supreme court reasoned
that although the intent of the Commissioners to retain a portion of all minerals
was clear in the minutes of the meeting, that intent was reflected with less
clarity by whomever was responsible for drafting the notice of sale.59
Thus, without resorting to the doctrine of ejusdem generis, Butler I con-
cluded that fifty percent of the coal was reserved to the state. The court held
the doctrine inapplicable because its application would defeat what the court
concluded was clear legislative intent. The court noted that the principle of
ejusdem generis was but one of many rules of statutory construction and it
was not to be applied automatically to every problem of statutory construc-
tion. 60 The court further noted that legislative intent is the cardinal rule of
statutory construction and that if the rule of ejusdem generis hindered or
defeated the legislative intent or purpose, the rule was inapplicable. 61 However,
54. Id. at 131.
55. Id. at 132. 64 OKLA. STAT. § 82(d) (1941), provides in relevant part:
The Commissioners ... shall reserve and retain forever the title to not less than
forty (40%) percentum of all the oil, gas, and other mineral rights in and under
all lands sold; [and] are empowered to join in the execution of any oil, gas, or
mineral lease on school lands, which have been sold and in which they have retain-
ed mineral interest .... Such reservation is to be set out and included in all Cer-
tificates of Purchase and Patents issued to cover lands hereafter sold by the Com-
missioners of the Land Office.
Section 96 requires the Commissioners, in all cases, to reserve and retain forever title to fifty
(50%) percentum of "oil, gas, and other mineral rights in and under the land so sold."
The Butler court cited State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 258 P.2d 1193 (Okla. 1953), in which
it was held that sections 82(d) and 96, even though somewhat contradictory, should both be
given effect. Thus, the fifty percentum reservation requirement of section 96 controls. Butler
11, 753 P.2d at 1341.
56. Id. at 132.
57. 64 Okla. Stat. § 82 (1941).
58. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
59. Butler 1, 53 OKLA. B.J. at 133.
60. Id. at 132.
61. Id. It is generally held that public grants receive a construction which supports the claim
of the government. Conversely, private grants are frequently construed most strongly against
the grantor. Reeves, supra note 10, at 441.
[Vol. 42
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the court limited its conclusion by holding that ejusdem generis was inap-
plicable only in situations involving similar conveyances by the Commis-
sioners. 62
Justice Hargrave, in his concurring opinion, concluded that it was unfor-
tunate that the majority apparently meant for private parties to depend solely
on ejusdem generis as the means by which an ambiguous grant would be con-
strued, while the state was excepted from the rule. He failed to see any reasons
why extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to assist in resolving all am-
biguities.
63
Justice Hargrave emphasized that ejusdem generis was a rule of construc-
tion-not of property." ' He cited Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 6 for the author-
ity that ejusdem generis should be utilized in conjunction with parol evidence.
Cronkhite, as noted by Justice Hargrave, also stands for the conclusion that
ejusdem generis is not to be used "where the result would be contrary to
the plain and clear intention of the parties.
' 66
The Oklahoma Supreme Court and Butler H
The supreme court granted a rehearing on the Butler controversy and in
May, 1988, withdrew its previous opinion. In a 5-4 decision, the court com-
pletely reversed its earlier opinion to hold that the phrase "oil, gas and other
minerals," as used in the patents, included only oil, gas and those minerals
produced as components and constituents thereof; thus, coal would not be
included in the reservation.
67
Additionally, the court rejected the Commissioners' argument that the
minutes of the meeting, recording the Commissioners resolution to sell the
property, should be admitted to show their clear intent to reserve fifty per-
cent of all the minerals. 68 Moreover, by noting that the land was sold for
more than its appraised value, the court summarily set aside the Commis-
sioners' argument that they were forbidden by the Constitution to reduce the
corpus of the trust.69 The Commissioners had argued the corpus was diminished
because the state received no direct remuneration for the coal rights.
70
Justice Opala, author of the 5-4 majority opinion in Butler I, dissented
in Butler II. In the dissent, he essentially restated the rationale of Butler L
7'
Justice Wilson, in a separate dissenting opinion, raised the interesting theory
62. Butler I, 53 OaA. B.J. at 132.
63. Id. at 134.
64. Id. at 136. A rule of construction would aid the court in determining the intent of the
parties to the conveyance. A rule of law would dictate that the court's decision would be made
according to established legal principles, allowing for no discretion in that decision. See BLACK's
LAW DicTloNAaY 692 (5th ed. 1979).
65. Butler 1, 53 OcLA. B.J. at 136.
66. Id. at 137 citing Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396, 399 (Okla. 1960).
67. Butler 11, 753 P.2d at 1334.
68. Id. at 1339.
69. Id.
70. Id. In order for the corpus of the trust to be diminshed, the land would have had to
sell for less than its appraised value.
71. Id. at 1340.
19891 NOTES
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that the state conveyed fifty percent of only oil, gas and their constituents
and components in the original patents, but did not convey any interest in
any other minerals. Justice Wilson concluded that by reading the language
of the granting clause, by considering the constitutional mandate, and by taking
notice of legislative enactments consistent with the trust mandate, Butler's
predecessor in interest was not offered nor did he or Butler ever receive, any
interest whatsoever in coal. Consequently, according to Justice Wilson, the




The Problems with Butler
The Butler decisions illustrate the problems generated by relying on ejusdem
generis as the only method of construction used with respect to an "oil, gas
and other minerals" grant or reservation. The problems are three-fold with
the first being the court's use of ejusdem generis in the fact situation peculiar
to Butler. The remaining two problems illustrate the difficulties with using
ejusdem generis generally.
Ejusdem Generis Overriding Legislative Intent
The first problem raised by Butler /is the court's conclusion that the phrase
"oil, gas and other minerals" is unambiguous. This virtually establishes the
meaning of the phrase as a rule of law in Oklahoma."' The basis for the con-
clusions expressed in Butler I was the court's refusal to apply ejusdem generis
if it would hinder or defeat legislative intent. However, Butler II has moved
Oklahoma away from the mainstream of judicial thought by strictly applying
ejusdem generis even if it defeats clear legislative intent.
7 4
A court's function as an interpretive body is to construe legislative enact-
ments in such a way that the intent of the legislature is carried out.7" In recogni-
tion of this responsibility, numerous courts have applied the principle that,
despite the existence of literal language that might dictate a contrary result,
a court should interpret a statute in such a way as to effectuate clear legislative
intent. 76 Oklahoma case law recognizes this principle as well. 7"
72. Id. at 1348. Justice Wilson's argument would have been far stronger if the statutes from
which the authority for the original patents came were couched in terms of a fifty percent grant
rather than a reservation of all minerals to the state. If termed a grant, by using ejusdem generis
it could be argued that all the state intended to convey was fifty percent of the oil, gas, and
substances of like or similar characteristics. Thus, in the same ejusdem generis analysis as Butler
II, a court would hold that all the grantee received was a fifty percent interest in oil, gas, and
those substances determined to be within the terminology of "other minerals." The state would
retain all other mineral interests.
73. Id. at 1337.
74. See Annotation, Supreme Court's Application of the Rules of Ejusdem Generis and Noscitur
a Sociis, 46 L.Ed. 2d 879 (1977).
75. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 75 (2d Cir. 1977).
76. Id. See also United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 298-301 (1971); Lynch v.
Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710-20 (1962); Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew,
329 U.S. 441, 446-49 (1947).




Legislative intent is of critical importance to public interest. This infent
is suggested by a careful reading of statutes governing transactions such as
the one between the Comissioners of the Land Office and Butler's predecessor
in interest. The titles to these statutes and the many references to mineral
rights in general strongly suggest a legislative design to require the state to
retain one half of all minerals in lands alienated through the Office of the
Land Commission. This strengthens the argument that the Commissioners had
no authority to convey more than fifty percent of all the minerals in the lands
covered by the patents.
Additionally, a court's construction of a statute must be guided by the charge
of advancing beneficial purposes desired by the legislature. The legislature,
by requiring a reservation, intended to preserve valuable mineral interests in
state owned lands. This purpose does not seem well served unless the statutorily
mandated reservation includes all minerals retained in the subsurface estate."8
Ejusdem generis is simply a rule of construction and should never be ap-
plied if the grantor's intent would be altered or destroyed by its application.79
This is particularly valid if the application of the doctrine overrides legislative
design." The majority in Butler II failed to keep the doctrine in the proper
perspective with respect to statutory and document construction.
The Commissioners of the Land Office have executed 11,000 patents, cover-
ing roughly 2,000,000 acres."1 All contain reservation language similar to the
Butler document. Each time there is a question regarding a substance the
ownership of which has not previously been determined, the issues in Butler
will rise again.
The Court's Refusal to Allow Extrinsic Evidence
The second problem with Butler II is the court's seeming insensitivity to
the reasoning of its own previous holdings, specifically Cronkhite v. Falken-
stein. Cronkhite held that parol evidence should be admitted when using
ejusdem generis to construct mineral conveyances.8 2
78. Id. at 1342.
79. Cronkhite, 352 P.2d at 399.
80. The logic behind restricting ejusdem generis to the status of a constructional aid was
eloquently addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County,
33 Utah 114, 93 P. 53, 56 (1907):
The doctrine of ejusdem generis is, however, only a rule of construction, and, like
all rules, is resorted to only as an aid to the courts in arriving at the true intent
of the lawmaker. These rules must not be applied so as to make them masters,
since they are servants merely. No rules of construction, however, can be permitted
to override the fundamental principle underlying all rules which requires that all
words contained within a statute [or instrument] must, if possible, be given their
ordinary meaning, and that the intention of the lawmaker must be garnered from
the language employed in the light of the context and of the subject-matter to which
it is applied, and when such intention is clear it must prevail notwithstanding some
rules to the contrary.
81. Butler 1, 53 OaA. B.J. at 143.
82. Cronkhite, 352 P.2d at 399.
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Generally, in other jurisdictions, coal is not included in a grant or reserva-
tion of "oil, gas and other minerals," absent evidence of contrary intent. 3
In Butler II, the meeting minutes, statutes and notices pertaining to the patents
and reservations indicated that fifty percent of all the minerals were intended
to be reserved by the state. However, the court applied a strict ejusdem generis
analysis. The court disregarded intent of the grantor even though evidence
of that intent was within reach of the court through testimony, documents
and other evidence.
Characteristics to Consider in Determining "Other Minerals"
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of Butler II is the confusion that will
undoubtedly occur concerning what, exactly, are substances which the court
would include in an "other mineral" portion of a grant. Butler II concludes
that chemical traits are not the criteria by which the determination can be
made. Instead, the court emphasized traits which a person of common
understanding would find similar or dissimilar. How the court expects these
traits to be determined is not clear.
On one hand, Butler II stands for the proposition that "oil, gas and other
minerals" has a definite meaning in Oklahoma. Extrinsic evidence is not
necessary with regard to the parties' intent because an instrument with such
language is not ambiguous-it simply does not include coal. Conversly, the
court did not rule out the possibility of resorting to extrinsic evidence to
establish what are, within the understanding of the common person, substances
of like nature with oil and gas. The decision is also somewhat questionable
because often parties to a mineral conveyance are far more knowledgable about
the issue than a person of common understanding.
The Butler 11 court, by failing to deal with the issue of "other minerals"
with more specificity, did nothing to reduce the litigious qualities of the ter-
minology. Moreover, the court failed to clarify a standard by which future
controversies, concerning substances not previously the focus of litigation,
can be settled.
What is needed to correct the problems presented in Butler II is an ap-
proach which takes a more rational and consistent view with respect to the
original intent of the parties to the conveyance. What is needed is a deter-
mination method which allows for a more natural separation between the sur-
face and mineral estates.
Solutions
Extrinsic Evidence
Several approaches readily stand out as solutions to the difficulties presented
by Butler II. First, regardless of the context in which "other mineral" ter-
minology arises, courts should resort to extrinsic evidence if available to deter-
mine how the phrase should be defined. Only in the event extrinsic evidence




is not within reach of the court should a court resort to another method or
aid to construction.
The application of ejusdem generis in a situation such as Butler II, in which
extrinsic evidence was available to the court for determining the intent of the
granting party, seemingly substitutes the convenience of the court for the par-
ties' interest in obtaining a true and exact determination. Of course, with much
of the extrinsic evidence available in Butler II being state statutes, minutes
of a state agency, and testimony of state officials, its exclusion raises another
issue. When a reasonable interpretation of outside evidence reveals legislative
intent contrary to the result obtained by the use of a constructional aid, the
legislative intent must prevail.
The Separation of the Surface and the Mineral Estates
The second approach which should be used in the event the actual intent
of the parties to a conveyance is not ascertainable separates the surface from
the mineral estate in such a way that all substances with value, or which become
valuable through advancing technology, belong to the mineral estate. This
would be true regardless of whether the minerals' presence is known at the
time of the conveyance. This, of course, does not include the soil itself, which
constitutes an integral part of the surface estate.
Several methods would achieve the purpose of separating the surface estate
from the mineral estate. These methods would broaden the definition of
minerals so that new substances, made economically attractive by advancing
technology, will be easily accomodated without litigation.
The General Intent Test
The first method for separating the surface estate, the "general intent"
test, advocates the separation of the surface estate completely from the mineral
estate if there is no qualifying language in the mineral conveyance. The
"general intent" test would regard a mineral conveyance which does not con-
tain language specifically including or excluding a substance, as an attempt




84. The "general intent" test was first advocated in Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and
Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107 (Spr. 1949), reprinted in, 34 OKLA. L. REv. 28 (1981). Pro-
fessor Kuntz addresses the issue as follows:
The contradiction and conflict ... arise from the very fact that the courts are
seeking to give effect to an intention to include or exclude a specific substance
when, as a matter of fact, the parties had nothing specific in mind on the matter
at all. The intention sought should be the general intent rather than any supposed
but unexpressed specific intent. ...
When a general grant or reservation is made of all minerals without qualifying
language, it should be reasonably assumed that the parties intended to sever the
entire mineral estate from the surface estate, leaving the owner of each with definite
incidents of ownership enjoyable in distinctly different manners. The manner of
enjoyment of the mineral estate is through extraction of valuable substances, and
the enjoyment of the surface is through retention of such substances as are necessary
for the use of the surface, and these representative modes of enjoyment must be
considered in arriving at the proper subject matter for each estate.
19891
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This test recognizes and validates the manner of enjoyment of the mineral
estate through the extraction of valuable substances. Likewise, the test ac-
comodates the manner of enjoyment of the surface estate through the reten-
tion of substances necessary for surface use. Absent language showing a specific
intent to the contrary, this test would separate the surface estate from the
mineral estate in such a way that the enjoyment of each would be in distinctly
different and virtually exclusive manners."
The Western Nuclear Test
The second method for separating the surface estate from the mineral estate
has its roots in case law and is similar to the "general intent" test. It arose
coincidentally, in a setting similar to the situation in Butler, and many of
the same issues were addressed. Therefore, it is particularly relevant to a discus-
sion of Butler.
This method arose in Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc." The United States
Supreme Court was charged with interpreting an "all coal and minerals" reser-
vation in lands patented under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916
("SRHA")87 In Western Nuclear, a mining company acquired a fee interest
through its predecessor in interest, in land covered by a patent under the
SRHA."8 The mining company was engaged in mining and milling uranium
ore in the same area in which it had the SRHA patent. The purpose of the
company obtaining the SRHA lands was to take advantage of a local source
of gravel for use in its mining operations and to pave the roads of a nearby
company town. 9
The company was notified by the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM")
that its removal of gravel constituted a trespass in violation of a Department
of Interior regulation."0 Western Nuclear filed suit in United States Disrtict
Court seeking review of the decision made by the BLM.11
Applying this intention, the severance should be construed to sever from the
surface all substances presently valuable in themselves, apart from the soil, whether
their presence is known or not, and all substances which become valuable through
development of the arts and sciences, and that nothing presently or prospectively
valuable as extracted substances would be intended to be excluded from the mineral
estate.
Id. at 33-34.
There have been recent attempts to adopt Professor Kuntz's test in Texas. See Note, "Oil,
Gas, and Other Minerals" Clauses in Texas: Who's on First?, 41 Sw. L.J. 695 (1987); Note,
Reformation of the "Other Mineral Provision" in Moser v. United States Steel Corporation,
10 T. MARSHALL L. RaV. 122 (1985).
85. Id.
86. 462 U.S. 36 (1983).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 39.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 40. This regulation provides that "[tihe extraction, severance, injury, or removal
of timber or mineral materials from public lands under jurisdictions of the Department of the
Interior, except where authorized by law and the regulations of the Department, is an act of
trespass." 43 CFR § 9239.0-7 (1982).
91. 462 U.S. at 41.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss3/5
The District Court upheld the BLM decision, finding gravel to be a mineral
within the SRHA reservations. Western Nulcear appealed and the Tenth Cir-
cuit subsequently reversed, finding that gravel was not a mineral.9" The case
was heard by the Supreme Court in January, 1983. 91
The Supreme Court formulated a four-part test in concluding that gravel
was part of the SRHA mineral reservation. The Court held that the mineral
reservation includes substances (1) that are mineral in character (that is, in-
organic), (2) that can be removed from the soil, (3) that can be used for com-
mercial purposes and (4) that were not intended to be included in the surface
estate.94 In its conclusion, the Court buttressed its opinion by citing "the
established rule that land grants are construed favorably to the Government,
that nothing passes except what is conveyed in clear language, and that if
there are doubts they are resolved for the Government, not against it." 9
Coal is inorganic, it is removed from the soil for commercial purposes,
and there is no reason for it to be included in the surface estate. Thus, under
the Western Nuclear test, coal would ordinarily be included in the mineral
estate. This is a better result than that reached in Butler II because it more
nearly approximates the natural separation between the surface and mineral
estates. The Western Nuclear test more logically conforms to the generally
accepted definition of the term mineral. Moreover, absent evidence of the
parties' specific intent, the Western Nuclear test remains faithful to the com-
plete separation of the two estates.
Conclusion
Both the "general intent" test and the Western Nuclear test accomplish
four goals the doctrine of ejusdem generis is not capable of resolving. First,
the surface estate is separated from the mineral estate in a manner in keeping
with the ordinary and common definitions of the two estates. Second, both
tests allow for a broad definition of minerals, flexible enough to accomodate
new substances made economically and commercially viable through newer
technology. Third, the litigious qualities of the language "other minerals"
would be removed, thereby stabilizing an otherwise troublesome area of mineral
and title law. Fourth, the problems presented by Butler II would easily be
resolved in a manner more consistant with legislative intent and public policy.
92. Id. at 42.
93. Id. at 36.
94. Id. at 53. For an Oklahoma application of the Western Nuclear Inc. test, see Millsap
v. Andrus, 717 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1983). The issue before the court was a mineral reservation
of "oil, gas, coal and other minerals" on the Osage Indian Reservation in Oklahoma. The court
held that there was nothing to indicate a mineral reservation should be limited. The court held
that limestone and dolomite were inorganic substances which could be removed from the soil
and used for commercial purposes, and there was no reason to suppose they were intended to
be included within the surface estate. Id. at 1329.
95. 462 U.S. at 59.
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The Butler 1I court concluded that the terminology "oil, gas and other
minerals" is not ambiguous in Oklahoma, it. has a definite meaning. Then
the court applied ejusdem generis, a constructional aid necessary only to con-
strue ambiguities, to determine the meaning of the phrase. Additionally, the
court ruled out the use of extrinsic evidence, even if indicative of the gran-
tor's true intent. Then the court set the stage for admitting extrinsic evidence
to determine what qualities make a substance of similar nature to the specifical-
ly named substances, thus including it in the "other mineral" portion of a
mineral conveyance.
Butler 11 stands for the conclusion that coal is not to be included in an
"oil, gas and other mineral" conveyance under any circumstances. Aside from
that, nothing in the court's opinion offers substance to the indefinite nature
of components or constituents of the specific words preceeding "other
minerals."
Far more important to the public interest than the vagueness of the Butler
11 court, however, is the court's cavalier treatment of seemingly clear legislative
purpose. The Butler 11 court failed in its duty to uphold statutes in a manner
consistent with the intentions of the legislature. Moreover, the court's holding
severely damaged the state's ability to care for the public trust. This interference
with the public interest surely was not contemplated by the drafters of the
supervisory legislation.
Ejusdem generis, in the majority of jurisdictions, is merely one construc-
tional aid among many. In Oklahoma, however, ejusdem generis apparently
exists for the convenience of the court, not as an aid to ascertain contractual
intent. The Butler 11 court has elevated the doctrine to the lofty status of
a rule of law without public or legislative mandate to do so.
There are solutions to the dilemma of an ambiguous mineral conveyance
which will eliminate all of the ills so evident in Butler 11. Perhaps, as more
far-sighted jurisdictions adopt tests which are more consistent, fair, flexible,
and protective of the public interests, the Oklahoma courts will abandon
ejusdem generis in the interest of good law.
It is far more likely, however, that any change in Oklahoma's interpreta-
tion of mineral conveyances, will come by legislative fiat. Perhaps, with the
damage the Butler 11 court has done to the corpus of the common school
trust, the motivation for change finally exists.
Don Strong
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